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Even ADR Must Pay Its Dues: An
Analysis of the Evolution of the
Internal Revenue Service’s ADR
Programs and Where They Still Need
to Grow
Stephen Folan1
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that “[t]oday, there can be little doubt that ‘alternative’
dispute resolution is anything but alternative.”2 Courts, agencies, and even
corporations are regularly utilizing a diverse range of alternative dispute
resolution procedures such as mediation, arbitration, and negotiation.3 Yet
one organization where alternative dispute resolution does not seem to be
fully embraced is the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The IRS Appeals
Office was created in 1927 to act as an independent entity for taxpayers to
settle their disputes outside of the IRS—although it is still subject to the
Service’s jurisdictionand it was designed as an option where taxpayers
could contest their claims in a fair and impartial forum.4 However, although
the stated goals of the Appeals Office are to resolve tax controversies
without litigation and to be fair and impartial to both parties, the IRS has had
significant difficulty implementing alternative dispute resolution.5 In fact,
one former tax court judge and mediator stated that “[p]ost-appeal mediation

1. Stephen Folan received his Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University School of Law in
2013. He was an Executive Editor for the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal and served
as Treasurer of the Labor and Employment Law Association.
2. Nancy A. Welsh, Integrating “Alternative” Dispute Resolution into Bankruptcy: As
Simple (and Pure) as Motherhood and Apple Pie?, 11 NEV. L.J. 397, 397 (2011).
3. Id.
4. Gregory P. Mathews, Using Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration to Resolve IRSTaxpayer Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 709, 713 (2004).
5. Christopher Wagner et al., How to Handle a Tax Controversy at the IRS and in Court,
ST009 ALI-ABA 89, 93 (2011).
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at the IRS is broken.”6 Although this declaration may be extreme, it is true
that, under the appeals process, both mediation and arbitration suffer mutual
problems that prevent the IRS from being effectively utilizing them to
resolve taxpayer disputes.7
Among other reasons, disputes arise when taxpayers disagree with an
IRS finding, refuse to file a tax return, or fail to comply with the IRS’s
request for more information.8 However, while the purpose of the IRS
Appeals Office is to resolve and settle disputes at the earliest opportunity,
the issues holding back mediation and arbitration limit them to acting as
narrowly focused alternatives with few of the advantages of commercial
alternative dispute resolution.9
The main cause for these issues is speculated to be a lack of trust
between both parties, which creates no incentive for taxpayers to actually
treat mediation or arbitration as viable alternatives to resolving their dispute
in the first place.10 Under the present alternative dispute resolution systems,
it appears difficult to actually establish that necessary trust between the IRS
and taxpayers. It appears that trust cannot be established because the postappeal process focuses on protecting the IRS rather than on creating a
neutral and independent environment with incentives for both parties to
resolve their disagreement.11
This article analyzes the IRS’s post-appeal mediation and arbitration
systems, and advocates for its adoption of contemporary commercial
arbitration principles to make its program desirable for both the IRS and
taxpayers. Part II will discuss the history and evolution of alternative
dispute resolution in the IRS’s appeals system. Part III will look at the
present state of the IRS’s dispute resolution processes. Part IV will consider
the underlying problems with the available dispute resolution processes.
Part V will recognize defenses in favor of the present systems. Part VI will
analyze three possible reforms and will advocate their adoption by the IRS,
6. Carolyn Miller Parr, Why Postappeal Mediation Isn’t Working and How to Fix It,
TAX.COM (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/11704085C68E8F7885
2576330002C150. Although IRS mediators attempt to be genuinely neutral and professional, the
problems with the post-appeal programs lie with the structure of the programs themselves. Id.
7. See id.
8. Mathews, supra note 4, at 709.
9. Id. at 709–10. Rather than extensively utilizing mediation and arbitration, the Appeals
Office relies on negotiations with an appeals officer, which results in questionable outcomes when
the taxpayer’s claim is too small to warrant an extensive defense or too large to bridge the gap
between the parties’ desires. Id. at 710–11.
10. See Parr, supra note 6.
11. See id. While it is true that IRS mediators and arbitrators strive to be genuinely impartial
and professional in performing their duties, the appearance of partiality still seems to prevent the
establishment of trust between both sides in the appeal process. Id.
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with the goal of making its dispute resolution processes more cost-effective
and desirable for both parties. Part VII will anticipate the potential impact
of these reforms on the IRS. Finally, Part VIII will restate the current IRS
appeals process and advocate its reform before briefly concluding.
II. HISTORY OF THE APPEALS MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION SYSTEMS
The Appeals Office of the IRS was first established in 1927 and regards
itself as one of the earliest dispute resolution organizations in the United
States.12 The Appeals Office was founded with the purpose of settling
disputes with taxpayers and avoiding litigation.13 As a result, unlike the IRS
Examination Division, which only analyzed black letter law and applied it to
taxpayers, the Appeals Office was empowered with the authority to consider
broader issues, such as the administrative costs and expenses of following
through with litigation or continued appeals.14 Although the primary method
used during the appeals process was negotiating settlements through IRS
officials, if those negotiations proved unsuccessful, the taxpayer had the
option to elect either mediation or arbitration.15 Mediation and arbitration
were initially quite limited in scope and applicability, but both are well
established parts of the IRS history of appeals.
While negotiation was traditionally the preferred method of resolving
disputes at the IRS, the Appeals Office began to expand its mediation and
arbitration programs following the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
(“ADRA”), which Congress passed in 1990.16 The ADRA mandated that
government agencies establish and implement alternative dispute resolution
methods in their administrative dispute resolution processes.17 As a result of

12. David Parsly, The Internal Revenue Service and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Moving
From Infancy to Legitimacy, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677, 678 (2007).
13. Id. at 678–79. The Appeals Office is seen as an efficient alternative to costly litigation in
the federal district courts or in the U.S. Tax Court that allows both parties to avoid litigation
expenses. Amy S. Wei, Can Mediation Be the Answer to Taxpayers’ Woes?: An Examination of the
Internal Revenue Service’s Mediation Program, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 551 (2000).
14. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679.
15. Id. However, these programs were not significantly expanded by the Appeals Office
because the negotiation process was generally regarded by the IRS as sufficient for settling taxpayer
disputes. See Wei, supra note 13, at 551. Because of this, a taxpayer is still only able to elect
alternative dispute resolution once settlement has failed under the normal negotiation procedures.
Id. at 552.
16. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679.
17. Mathews, supra note 4, at 715.
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the congressional mandate, the IRS expanded and created more formal
procedures for arbitration and mediation of taxpayer disputes.18
The IRS’s first step was to further integrate mediation in 1995 by
making it available both during the appeals program and during litigation in
tax court.19 In 2000, the IRS implemented the second step by introducing
arbitration during the post-appeal process.20 However, the scope of the
arbitration is highly limited and is designed only to resolve factual issues
relevant to the taxpayers’ disputes.21 In addition, at any time during the
appeals process or during the available alternative dispute resolution
procedures, the taxpayer remains free to pursue traditional litigation
instead.22
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT APPEALS SYSTEMS
Although alternative dispute resolution programs are available both
prior to and following the appeals program, it is prudent to start at the
beginning because the pre-appeal programs are considerably more utilized
than the post-appeal programs.23 Generally when an audit of a taxpayer’s
tax return leads to a disputed amount in his taxable income, the taxpayer is
issued a letter informing him that he has thirty days in which to file a request
for appeals to reconsider the adjustment.24 However, prior to receiving the
thirty-day letter, the taxpayer may elect to engage in mediation with the IRS

18. See id. at 716. As part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the IRS began to
implement more formalized alternative dispute resolution procedures in order to supplement the
negotiations process and to improve its image and service to taxpayers. Id. at 715–16.
19. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679. The role of mediation has consistently increased since the
program was instituted. Id. However, the program has not met significant success, most likely due
to the unequal positions between the two parties under the current system. See Peyton H. Robinson,
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures with IRS Appeals, 23 UTAH B.J. 18, 21–22 (March/April
2010).
20. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679–80. Although post-appeal arbitration was only introduced as
a trial program, the program was modified and extended past its trial period in 2002 and is still
offered to taxpayers. Id.
21. Robinson, supra note 19, at 22. This program is significantly different from commercial
arbitration because it lacks many of the rules and procedures that commercial arbitration uses to
enforce independence. Id. Furthermore, it is also distinct from international treaties between the
IRS and other countries, which mandate that the arbitrator must choose between the best positions
offered by both parties. Id. Without assurances of independence or other incentives, taxpayers have
had relatively little reason to elect the program.
22. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 680.
23. See id. at 711.
24. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 18. If the taxpayers fail to file the request for appeals,
then a second letter advises them that they have ninety days to file a petition with the tax court
before collection begins. Id. The original letter is generally the taxpayer’s only window for
reconsidering the proposed adjustment prior to litigation. Id.
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under either the Fast Track Mediation (FTM) or Fast Track Settlement (FTS)
programs.25
Under the FTM program, the taxpayer can choose to mediate disputed
issues with the IRS by calling in an appeals officer empowered to act as a
“neutral third party” to the dispute.26 FTM is generally available as an
optional program, that may be elected by the taxpayer, but the process may
be terminated at will by either party.27 One advantage of FTM is that it does
not replace other dispute resolution options, and should mediation prove
unsuccessful, the taxpayer may still choose to continue through the appeals
process once the mediation is over and the thirty-day letter is issued.28
Because the appeals officer is not empowered to consider the hazards of
litigation in mediating the factual dispute, the FTM program is generally
thought to be advantageous where the law is clear and only the facts are in
dispute, because it allows the parties to come to a quick and expedient
understanding before the issue goes on to appeals or litigation.29
While the goal of the FTM program is to mediate the dispute prior to
receiving a thirty-day letter, the purpose of the FTS program is to resolve
and settle the case within 120 days by arriving at a mediated settlement.30
One of the primary distinctions between FTM mediation and FTS mediation
is that, under the FTS program, the appeals officer acting as a mediator is
empowered to consider the hazards of litigation as part of his or her
settlement authority.31 Much like under the IRS’s other mediation programs,
if the FTS mediation is unsuccessful, the taxpayer does not waive any
administrative rights and may continue with the normal appeals process.32
The ideal role for the FTS program is seen not as a method for the taxpayer

25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. While successful enough to warrant extension past its initial pilot period, this program
is available only to the Small Businesses/Self-Employed division of the IRS. Parsly, supra note 12,
at 695.
27. Robinson, supra note 19, at 18–19.
28. Id. at 19.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 19–20. Similar to the limitations under the FTM program, the taxpayer is generally
only eligible to elect FTS before the IRS issues a thirty-day letter. Id. at 20.
31. Parsly, supra note 12, at 692. However, if the settlement is based on the hazards of
litigation, an appeals closing agreement is necessary and subject to approval from management.
Robinson, supra note 19, at 20. A further distinction is that while FTM is available to small
businesses and to self-employed taxpayers, FTS is limited to large and mid-sized businesses. See id.
at 18–20.
32. Robinson, supra note 19, at 20.
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to avoid adjustment, but instead as an outlet for the parties to reach an
agreement on how much will be paid in a quicker and more efficient
manner.33
Because not all taxpayers agree upon a settlement during the appeals
process, a taxpayer still has the option to participate in post-appeal
mediation or arbitration.34 However, these programs are significantly less
utilized and are considered more controversial because of perceived
inequality between the two parties.35 The IRS updated its post-appeals
mediation program, which was formally established in 2002, in 2009 by
issuing Revenue Procedure 2009-44, which expanded and clarified the types
of cases that were applicable for post-appeals mediation.36 As a general rule,
post-appeal mediation is available only in situations where appeals
settlement negotiations have occurred and there are still remaining issues to
mediate.37 Furthermore, in order to be applicable for post-appeal mediation,
all other issues must already be resolved except for the issues being
mediated.38
The final option is post-appeal arbitration of tax disputes. This program
is meant to be utilized when negotiations have dragged on unsuccessfully for
a significant amount of time and the taxpayer believes that the dispute has
legitimate merit.39 In such a situation, post-appeal arbitration is available for
the limited purpose of resolving only the factual issues relevant to the
dispute.40 The program is optional and may be elected by either the taxpayer
or the Appeals Office, subject to consultation with the other party.41 Both
parties must enter a written agreement to arbitrate that (1) specifies the issue
that the parties agreed to have arbitrated, (2) assigns the arbitrator the task of
finding facts, (3) precisely describes the answer that the parties seek, (4)
describes and limits the information the arbitrator may consider, (5) contains
an initial list of participants from each party, (6) provides a mutually agreed
time and place of hearings, and (7) prohibits ex parte contacts between the
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 21.
35. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
36. Rev. Proc. 2009-44, 2009-40 I.R.B. 462.
37. See id.
38. See id. The Revenue Procedure specifically excludes from eligibility issues that are
designated for litigation, deemed inappropriate under statutory or administrative guidelines, and
considered frivolous or otherwise inequitable. Id.
39. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 22.
40. See id. However, in some situations, post-appeal arbitration may also be available after
the taxpayer engages in unsuccessful post-appeal mediation. Id. In order to transfer the mediation
into arbitration, the relevant factual issues must be the determinative reason that the mediation
failed. Id.
41. Rev. Proc. 2006-44, 2006-2 C.B. 800.
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arbitrator and the parties.42 The parties must mutually agree to select an
arbitrator either from the appeals office or from a local or national
arbitration organization.43
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT APPEALS SYSTEMS
Critics of the IRS’s alternative dispute resolution systems typically
focus on the fact that the Appeals Office has been reluctant to fully embrace
and implement mediation and arbitration as effective alternatives to its
established negotiation procedures.44 For example, although the use of preappeal mediation by the IRS and taxpayers is steadily increasing, to the point
of being called an “unmitigated success,” its integration into the appeals
process has been narrowly limited in scope and expanded only gradually
with each test program.45 One issue with the FTM program is that the
taxpayer cannot have an outside party conduct the mediation: the mediator
must be an IRS employee.46 Because of this restriction, one of the most
enduring and problematic concerns with FTM is the perceived lack of
impartiality.47 Critics of the FTM program rightly suggest that the success
of any mediation depends on open communication and trust between the
participants.48 Without a mediator that both parties recognize and trust to be
impartial, the parties cannot be confident enough to fully disclose
information and take the mediator’s evaluations at face value.49

42. Id. Examples of precise answers include a specific monetary value, a range of acceptable
monetary values, and a clearly affirmative or negative finding by the court. Id.
43. Id. In the event an outside arbitrator is selected, the parties must share the costs.
Robinson, supra note 19, at 22. This includes not only compensation for the arbitrator, but all
expenses, related fees, and reasonable costs. Rev. Proc. 2006-44, 2006-2 C.B. 800. On the other
hand, if an appeals officer is selected, the Appeals Office will pay all expenses associated with the
arbitrator, effectively making it more likely to be the default position for a taxpayer. Id.
44. See Wei, supra note 13, at 551. As evidence of this, although the IRS is required under the
ADRA to engage in alternative dispute resolution, in most cases it is available only after negotiations
have been attempted and failed. Id. at 552–53.
45. Id. at 559–60. One member of Congress went so far as to recognize that not only should
the IRS put mediation to greater use, but also that taxpayers should be encouraged to believe that it
is “the right thing to do.” Id. at 560.
46. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 730.
47. See id. at 729–31.
48. Id. at 717–18.
49. Id. at 718. Although appeals officers are specially trained and tend to behave with genuine
neutrality, the fact that they are still IRS employees paid by the agency makes it difficult for
taxpayers to actually believe they will be impartial mediators. See Parr, supra note 6.
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In addition to sharing many of the same inherent issues as FTM, the
IRS’s current FTS procedure has a number of additional flaws that
discourage taxpayers from believing that its election is to their benefit. One
of the chief drawbacks is the lack of restrictions against ex parte
communications between appeals officers.50 As a result, if FTS is elected
and results in a failure to settle, there are no limitations in place to prohibit
subsequent appeals officers who work on the case from discussing anything
that came up in the settlement discussions.51 There are no limitations
stopping the taxpayer from returning to the appeals process after
unsuccessful mediation. Yet because all information resulting from that
mediation is available upon returning to appeals, this seems to indicate that
there is very little reason under the current system for a taxpayer to elect the
option in the first place.
Post-appeal mediation suffers from substantially similar problems as
pre-appeal mediation, but in many cases these issues only become more
pronounced after the appeals process.52 Because the default position of the
IRS is to use its own specially trained appeals officers as mediators, it is
difficult to convince taxpayers that the officer can truly be an unbiased party
in the discussion.53 This means that the taxpayer is unable to speak candidly
with the mediator, even if the mediator is a specially trained professional
who truly does attempt to act in a fair and unbiased manner.54 Mediation is a
second chance for a taxpayer to convince a neutral third party that he or she
has a valid argument against the IRS, but it is difficult for any taxpayer to
believe that an IRS employee will be more swayed by his or her argument
than by his or her employer’s argument.55
While the mediation programs have definite room for improvement,
post-appeal arbitration is in the worst position of the IRS’s various dispute
resolution options. Critics of the program recognize that, under the current
process, there is very little incentive for taxpayers to elect post-appeal

50. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 20. This is explicitly stated in IRS revenue procedures,
which clearly indicate a lack of restrictions upon intra-appeals communications. Id.
51. See id.
52. See supra notes 34–35, 46–57 and accompanying text.
53. See Parr, supra note 6. Even though it is possible for the taxpayer to bring in an outside
mediator, he or she must bear the costs, which makes it an unprofitable and highly discouraging
option for a taxpayer who is trying to save the money he denies is owed to the IRS. Id.
54. See id.
55. Mathews, supra note 4, at 728. Mediation also represents a chance for the taxpayer to
discover holes in his argument in advance of litigation, convincing him to settle beforehand. Id.
However, he clearly may be concerned that an IRS mediator’s perspective could be biased. See id.
at 729–30.
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arbitration—and it is frequently not even attempted.56 Similar to the
mediation programs’ method of selecting mediators, both IRS and non-IRS
officials may be chosen as arbitrators.57 Yet if the arbitrator is a non-IRS
official, then the parties must share costs, which means that an IRS appeals
officer is likely to be the arbitrator by default.58 The problem with this is
that, unlike commercial arbitration, there are no assurances of arbitrator
independence.59 In fact, the Appeals Office is even allowed to bring in other
appeals officers or IRS chief counsel attorneys to participate in the
arbitration, creating even more doubt for the taxpayer that the process will
be independent and confidential.60 Additionally, should the taxpayer
actually attempt to elect post-appeal arbitration, the program is completely
optional and must be agreed upon by both sides, so there is no guarantee that
the IRS will agree to arbitrate in the first place.61 Should the IRS refuse,
there is no system in place to appeal the refusal, providing even less
incentive for the taxpayer to make the attempt.62
V. DEFENSE OF THE CURRENT APPEALS SYSTEMS
Advocates of the present ADR programs at the Appeals Office typically
emphasize the position shared by the IRS itself: that the primary focus of the
Appeals Office is negotiation rather than mediation or arbitration.63 As a
result, its programs are designed with a purposely narrow scope and
application so that they can supplement, rather than replace, the existing
negotiation process.64 Further, there are concerns that non-IRS mediators

56. See Stephen Joyce, Officials Urge Taxpayers to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution Tools,
105 DAILY TAX REPORT G-3 (June 1, 2007). The IRS acknowledged that although the program was
instituted in 2000, only fourteen taxpayers had actually requested post-appeal arbitration as of 2007.
Id. Furthermore, of those fourteen, only one taxpayer’s case had actually been resolved as a result.
Id.
57. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 711–12.
58. See id. at 711–12.
59. Robinson, supra note 19, at 22.
60. Id. at 22.
61. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 711.
62. Id. A taxpayer may request a conference in order to discuss the denial with the Appeals
Office, but there are no regulations or standards under which the office is required to reconsider. Id.
63. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 714. This belief is partially justified by the high rate of
success the IRS has with negotiations, but understates the value that mediation and arbitration offer
as equally valid alternatives. See Wei, supra note 13, at 551–52.
64. Mathews, supra note 4, at 716.
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would be unfamiliar with tax law and that the lack of expertise would offset
the value of their mediation experience.65
The argument in favor of the present FTM procedure emphasizes that
the program is a promising development that will slowly expand as the IRS
works towards improving its efficiency and fairness.66 While recognizing
that the IRS has significant room for improvement in its mediation protocol,
defenders of the program see it not as a final product, but as a good
foundation, noting that in 2002 the program was made a permanent and
more accessible part of the appeals process.67 The success of its limited trial
programs is an encouraging sign that the IRS will further expand mediation
as a viable alternative, but this can only happen once the IRS overcomes its
reluctance to expand from its existing negotiations programs.68
Furthermore, promoters of the FTS program recognize that, although it
may be ineffective in assisting taxpayers to actually avoid a judgment, it is at
least moderately successful as a way of coming to a quickly expedited
agreement with the IRS.69 While average audit cases take almost two years
to move through the appeals process, successful FTS cases resolve in
considerably less time, saving both parties time and money regardless of the
amount the case settles for.70 The FTS program routinely settles cases even
faster than its stated goal of resolving cases in 120 days, indicating that the
program is both quick and efficient despite its procedural shortcomings.71
The program proved sufficiently successful by the IRS’s standards, such
that it was expanded to small businesses and to tax exempt or governmental
entities in 2008.72 However, while it is clear that FTS is a moderate success
in spite of its procedural shortcomings, the program can become an even
greater success by addressing its problems and by becoming be more
procedurally efficient. Therefore, it is important to do this early on, before

65. Wei, supra note 13, at 567. However, some state agencies have had success with outside
mediators by placing strict requirements such as classroom training, a minimum number of
observations or co-mediations with experienced IRS mediators, and a degree from an accredited
college. Id. In order to even qualify for mediation of a topic outside of their expertise, more
extensive training is further required. Id. This seems to greatly reduce the concern that only appeals
officers are qualified to mediate tax issues.
66. Mathews, supra note 4, at 728.
67. Id. at 720. Specifically, eligibility requirements for access to the program were
significantly reduced, with an amount in controversy requirement being completely abolished. Id.
68. See id. at 721.
69. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 20.
70. Id. at 21. IRS officials note that FTS cases typically resolve in an average of only seventynine days, compared to typical results of over 600 days for complex audit cases subjected to
negotiations. Id.
71. See id. at 20.
72. Id. at 21.
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subsequent programs pattern themselves on the same approach, so that the
steps taken by the IRS to expand its mediation system are as effective as
possible.
Although recognizing that the IRS’s post-appeal arbitration program is
flawed when compared to both negotiation and mediation, defenders of the
IRS’s arbitration program believe that it still offers significant advantages
over litigation.73 Namely, it provides an average taxpayer with a setting in
which to present his case that is more relaxed, but still formal and
structured.74 The program is emphasized as a “last resort” after negotiations
and mediation have failed to settle the dispute.75 Under this interpretation,
the fact that it is rarely elected may be an intentional outcome, because the
goal of the Appeals Office is to resolve cases before they ever reach the
point where arbitration becomes necessary.76
VI. A CASE FOR POSSIBLE REFORMS OF THE APPEALS SYSTEMS
The first possible reform of the current Appeals Office’s alternative
dispute resolution process is to mandate mediation. This is one of the first
places where reform of the dispute resolution procedure should begin, as
mediation’s benefits are such that it should be placed as early in the appeals
process as possible. Mediation is recognized as particularly well-suited to
tax disputes because it allows for flexible outcomes and greatly decreases
transaction costs if successful; this means that even settling for an amount
less than the full amount in controversy is more profitable than receiving the
full amount after costly litigation.77 In addition, it is clear that there is both
political and public support for mediation as a viable method of resolving
tax disputes, making it an excellent time to consider mediation as an
alternative option rather than merely a secondary approach to negotiation.78

73. Mathews, supra note 4, at 731–32.
74. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 713–14.
75. Id. at 714.
76. Id. Because post-appeal arbitration is rarely ever elected, this is taken as validating this
belief in practice. Id. However, it is unclear whether the rare usage of the program is a result of
intentional design or is an unexpected consequence of the program’s lack of incentives for taxpayers
to elect it in the first place. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
77. Leonora Meyercord, Avoiding State Bankruptcy: Mediation as an Alternative to Resolving
State Tax Disputes, 29 REV. LITIG. 925, 931 (2010).
78. See id. at 934–35. The ADRA is a clear indication that the trend in Congress is to further
encourage ADR procedures. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 679. This is reinforced by the IRS’s
tentative but promising attempts to expand and formalize its mediation programs. Id.
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With more and more agencies and courts adopting mediation as a
regular facet of their dispute resolution procedures, there is little reason for it
to be merely a second choice at the IRS, and requiring it at the outset as a
precursor to negotiations could lead to a beneficial result much earlier in the
appeals process.79 In many state courts, mediation as a form of dispute
resolution is not only strongly encouraged, but is often a required prelitigation consideration by the parties.80 This is true even though the parties
in such cases do not necessarily have to settle or accept the outcome of their
mediation.81 In some approaches, initial participation in the mediation
process is a condition precedent to even advancing onward to litigation at
all.82
Because mediation remains essentially voluntary, both the courts’
interest in efficient, less expensive resolutions and the power of parties to
resolve their disputes in the manner they see fit are still respected and
advanced.83 Putting mediation at the forefront of the appeals process and
requiring the parties to at least attempt mediation benefit both the IRS and
the taxpayer sooner, by giving them an option to attempt resolving their
dispute before continuing on to the appeals process, rather than leaving them
to go through the negotiation process first.84
A second suggested reform of the Appeals Office’s alternative dispute
resolution procedures is making it more independent. Although all evidence
indicates that appeals officers are professionals who strive to remain
independent and impartial—despite being on the IRS payroll—the Appeals
Office has been rightfully criticized for fostering at least the appearance of
partiality.85 Though not always a rational or even realistic belief, it is easy to
understand why a taxpayer might believe that an IRS agent acting as a
79. Welsh, supra note 2, at 397.
80. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 1247
(2009). See also 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2006) (requiring litigants to at least consider the use of
alternative dispute resolution processes and permitting district courts to require their use in
appropriate cases).
81. Nolan-Haley, supra note 80, at 1254. This approach has also been explicitly allowed by
Congress for labor disputes, where the Railway Labor Act codified mediation as the primary method
of resolving disputes and required initial attendance of both parties at mediations. Wei, supra note
11, at 565–66.
82. Nolan-Haley, supra note 80, at 1253.
83. Dr. iur. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party EmpowermentAgainst a Good-Faith
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 10–11 (2004).
84. Although the IRS is experimenting with early mediation through the FTM and FTS
programs, the problem is that entry into both programs remains optional and is easily terminated.
See id. at 5–7. Rather than requiring the parties to at least consider mediation at the outset, using
these programs is completely optional, which means many cases that could benefit from early
mediation do not. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 19–20.
85. Parr, supra note 6.
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mediator is inherently biased in favor of his or her employer. Yet under the
present system, it is unfortunately often difficult for taxpayers to justify
bringing in an independent mediator because the default position of the IRS
is to use their own appeals officers.86 In order to convince taxpayers that
mediation is in their best interest, it is necessary to take steps to convince
them that their mediator will act as an impartial third party rather than as an
IRS agent.
For example, one solution proposed by scholars is the creation of a new
unit, tentatively titled the “ADR Center,” which would be distinct from the
Appeals Office with its own staff acting as mediators and arbitrators.87 This
would bring the IRS closer in line to the dispute resolution programs
available under other federal agencies, which provide for outside third party
mediators rather than agency employees.88 Furthermore, this would also
bring IRS dispute resolution more in line with commercial dispute resolution
procedure, which emphasizes not only the reality but also the perception of
impartiality as being equally necessary for dispute resolution to be
effective.89 It is vital for the IRS to take steps to both provide impartiality
and to convince taxpayers that it exists—and this simply cannot be
accomplished by continuing to utilize in-house employees on the payroll of
only one party in the dispute.
The third reform for the Appeals Office’s alternative dispute resolution
programs is updating the arbitration process to better match the standards of
commercial arbitration. Although arbitration reform may be seen as less
urgent than mediation reform due to its placement at the end of the appeals
process—when both parties have already established their positions before
trial—it is still worth developing because it is a highly preferable alternative
86. See Wei, supra note 13, at 567. This is particularly true of post-appeals mediation
because, in order to bring in an outside mediator, the taxpayer must bear the mediator’s full fee and
expenses rather than split the costs between both parties. Parr, supra note 6. Additionally, even if
the outside mediator is brought in, he is required to co-mediate with an IRS mediator under
circumstances in which each party only trusts “its” mediator to be on its side. Id.
87. John Klotsche, Jousting with the Tax Man: ADR at the IRS, Part II, TAX.COM (Sept. 14,
2009), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/BF3113A27C566E3D8525762E0060948D.
The proposal recognizes that taxpayers are unlikely to see IRS appeals offices as independent third
parties, despite the officers’ training as such. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. However, it would be difficult for the Appeals Office to achieve genuine independence
with its current staff and structure. Id. Thus, the concept of a separate ADR Center working
together with the Appeals Office is ideal because it would provide experienced mediators who are
well-versed with the tax process, but without having to put appeals employees in the middle of
disputes between Appeals and the taxpayer. Id.
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to litigation should the other processes fail.90 Even if a majority of cases
settle before that point, a well-established and efficient arbitration program
may mean the difference between settling the remainder of cases that reach
that point or going onward to the expense of litigation.
The Appeals Office’s current arbitration procedure has little in common
with modern arbitration methods either in commercial settings or even in
other IRS arbitration programs. In commercial arbitration, arbitrators must
be impartial and satisfy strict standards in order to ensure both sides are
satisfied that the arbitrator is a neutral party.91 In fact, this strictly enforced
independence is typically one of the primary motivations that compel parties
in commercial settings to use arbitration in the first place: because the
opposing sides are more willing to settle their dispute in arbitration because
they believe the forum is a neutral setting where they each have a fair chance
of obtaining what they want.92 In order to compel the parties to make a good
faith effort to work out their dispute, commercial arbitrators commonly
employ “last offer arbitration”—otherwise known as “baseball
arbitration”—to lead both parties towards a mutually acceptable settlement
amount.93 This technique requires each party to state its best offer for the
award amount. The arbitrator is empowered only to select one offer or the
other.94 As a result, it is in the best interest of both parties to determine what
they honestly believe to be a reasonable offer; if one side is too extreme,
then that side runs the risk of the other party’s number being chosen
instead.95 Though not perfectly applicable to tax disputes, this demonstrates
the flexibility that arbitration can still bring to the appeals process. It would
make an excellent starting point for the IRS in considering alternative
methods, which settle otherwise irreconcilable disputes before the parties
run the risk of taking the last step towards even more time consuming and
expensive litigation.
Another important principle of commercial arbitration that the Appeals
Office should consider adopting is an emphasis on the impartiality of
arbitrators.
In international commercial arbitration, the procedures
specifically mandate that any potential arbitrator act impartially according to
a list of recognized standards and rules of practice.96 There are no similar
90. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 4 (2008).
91. See Klotsche, supra note 87.
92. See MOSES, supra note 90, at 3.
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. International Dispute Resolution Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
(June 1, 2010), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994.
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assurances under IRS procedures that an appeals arbitrator’s independence is
ensured by such specific guidelines, and in the absence of any serious
restrictions on the partiality of an appeals arbitrator, taxpayers seemingly are
not convinced that the program is in their best interests.97 By taking similar
steps to commercial arbitration procedures, to assure taxpayers that they
truly are being heard by a neutral arbitrator, the Appeals Office may be able
to foster the taxpayer confidence necessary for arbitration to be a successful,
viable dispute resolution alternative and encourage disputants to pursue it
when appeals reach that point.
However, it is noteworthy that not only is appeals arbitration different
from what is successfully practiced in commercial settings, but the system is
also markedly different from the methods otherwise utilized by the IRS.
This is because its arbitration is an optional choice at the end of the appeals
process, rather than mandatory like in other IRS programs.98 For example,
under its international income tax treaties with other countries, mandatory
arbitration is allowed for the specific purpose of supplementing the
negotiation process.99 In order to carry out mandatory arbitration, the IRS
partnered with the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), a
non-profit public service organization which agreed to provide
administrative services.100 Rather than using IRS employees as arbitrators,
through their partnership agreement, the ICDR is able to independently
select potential arbitrators with relevant tax and arbitration experience.101
The Appeals Office may well be able to benefit from a similar partnership in
order to provide mandatory arbitration at the end of the appeals process,
further reducing the amount of tax disputes that actually go all the way to
trial.
While mediation is the first and foremost topic of reform that the
Appeals Office should look at, it is clear that there are also numerous ways
that its arbitration program can be refined and modernized by examining
97. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text (suggesting that without assurances of
independent and impartial arbitrators that there is little incentive for taxpayers to attempt arbitration).
98. Compare I.R.S. Announcement 2011-4 I.R.B. 433 (limiting arbitration and mediation to an
optional election that may be requested only after consulting with the other party and getting them to
concur), with Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 10, 2008),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/Mandatory-Tax-Treaty-Arbitration
(requiring mandatory arbitration as a supplement to the standard negotiation process).
99. See Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration, supra note 98.
100. Id. Services rendered include training, selection of neutral arbitrators, case management,
and institutional experience and expertise in the field. Id.
101. Id.
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how successful arbitration programs are run elsewhere. By reforming the
process for post-appeal arbitration to better resemble these more successful
commercial and international arbitration institutions, arbitration may be
converted from an inferior “last resort” to a more viable alternative or
effective safety net should mediation and negotiation fail.
VII. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION REFORMS IN THE IRS APPEALS PROCESS
It is important to stress that this article does not propose that the IRS
should elevate alternative dispute resolution procedures to a higher status
than the existing negotiation process, but instead suggests that the appeals
office should integrate mediation and arbitration in ways that complement
the negotiations procedure. Dispute resolution processes should serve as
“bookends” that potentially settle disputes either before or after they go
through the negotiation process.102 The success of the existing negotiation
process cannot be questioned, but the IRS can further improve the process
through better use of mediation and arbitration.103 There are several possible
benefits that both the IRS and taxpayers may expect from these reforms.
The first impact from mediation and arbitration reforms—perhaps even
the primary impact—would be offering a significant financial benefit to both
the IRS and taxpayers. Integrating alternative dispute resolution into the
appeals process would allow the IRS to manage its costs and allocate its
resources more effectively, allowing the Service to not only settle more
disputes without reaching litigation, but also to more efficiently prepare for
the smaller number of cases which are not settled by the appeals office.104
This increased flexibility would also benefit taxpayers by providing them
with a faster and more reliable way to equitably settle their disputes in
comparison to litigation, which is recognized as “costly, time-consuming,
unpredictable, and . . . a last-resort remedial option.”105 Finally, a less
102. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (noting that mediation is particularly wellsuited to settling tax disputes and should be equal in status to negotiations as a viable alternative
dispute resolution option).
103. See supra notes 15, 63 and accompanying text (recognizing that the IRS relies on
negotiations as its primary focus due to its high rate of success but arguing that arbitration and
mediation are capable of equivalent levels of success).
104. See, e.g., John Klotsche, Jousting with the Tax Man, Part 1, Section III.A., TAX.COM
(Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/C844618C8C5792968525762E00
63E693. Recognized benefits to the IRS include the ability to reduce the total cost and labor
currently devoted to conflicts rather than to negotiation, as well as the option to craft more flexible
results and terms than are possible under the current system. Id.
105. Id.
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obvious benefit to the IRS is that, by improving the mediation and
arbitration procedures utilized by the Appeals Office, the agency will also
create a more “resolution-focused atmosphere” where the quality of each
settlement reached would improve with experience.106 Such an atmosphere
could lead to more cases being settled through arbitration and mediation,
resulting in greater financial benefit for the IRS as more cases are settled
quickly for amounts that are satisfactory to both parties.107
In addition, a second promising outcome of alternative dispute
resolution reform is that it could significantly bolster the IRS’s public
relations efforts, while improving the Appeals Office’s legitimacy in the
eyes of taxpayers. The IRS has a vested interest in improving its public
relations because improving the way taxpayers look at the tax system has a
direct relationship in how willingly they submit both to taxation itself and to
participation in dispute resolution related to taxation.108
Increased
willingness to engage in open dispute resolution with a neutral third party
acting as the arbitrator or mediator, rather than an IRS employee whose
interests are seen as closer to the Service than to the taxpayer, would greatly
improve the outlook that the taxpayer takes away from the experience.109
However, the potential benefits from such an improvement would extend
beyond merely improving the Service’s reputation. In order to have a
successful taxation system, it is vital for the IRS to have “an effective
grievance handling system” for dealing with unsatisfied taxpayers when
conflicts arise.110 Developing the idea that the IRS is open to settlement
through arbitration and mediation is in the Service’s best interest: a system
that taxpayers trust to ensure a fair and equitable outcome results in
increased confidence that resolution will be possible outside of court.111 The
Appeals Office already enjoys a high success rate, thanks to its well-

106. Mathews, supra note 4, at 734–35. This atmosphere would be the result of most disputes
going through the various ADR processes, creating a perception that almost all disputes could be
settled without litigation. Id.
107. See id. at 735.
108. See Wei, supra note 13, at 549.
109. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (stating that mediators in the current
appeals mediation programs typically must be IRS employees, and that this system prevents the
taxpayer from believing that the mediator is a truly neutral third party).
110. Wei, supra note 13, at 549. The IRS National Director of Appeals has gone as far as
suggesting that improved alternative dispute resolution is essential to creating an effective system
that handles grievances and promotes voluntary participation by taxpayers. Id. at 549–50.
111. Mathews, supra note 4, at 736.
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established negotiations process,112 but providing more well-rounded
procedures to cater to taxpayer needs can only further improve its public
image. Further bolstering the image of the Appeals Office as a legitimate
outlet for dispute resolution where settlement is not only possible, but almost
a certainty—even if negotiations fall through—could have the direct result
of convincing more taxpayers that it is in their best interest to comply with
the appeals process and to consistently avoid the expense of possible
litigation.113
As a result of improving the public’s perception of the Appeals Office,
the third outcome is creating greater incentive for taxpayers to participate in
the appeals process in the first place. One of the biggest issues that scholars
recognize with the current mediation and arbitration programs is a lack of
taxpayer participation.114 However, this reluctance is unsurprising, because
under the current system there is relatively little reason for taxpayers to
believe that submitting to arbitration or mediation is in their best interests.115
The current mediation system offered by the Appeals Office is regarded as
“designed solely to protect the IRS from wily taxpayers” and does little to
encourage trust on the part of the taxpayer who must submit to it.116 This
runs contrary to one of the main advantages of both arbitration and
mediation, which is the ability for the parties to settle their dispute in a
neutral forum where neither side believes the other has a “home court
advantage.”117 In fact, this promise of a neutral forum has been recognized
as one of the primary reasons that commercial arbitration is so desirable: it
encourages disputants to take part in a settlement process where they are
confident that they will receive a fair hearing and an equitable outcome.118
While the accomplishments of the Appeals Office and its negotiation
procedures are an impressive testament to the IRS’s history of resolving
disputes without litigation, the success of appeals in one approach should not
prevent Appeals from exploring other avenues that may be promising as

112. See supra notes 9, 63 and accompanying text (suggesting that the success of the appeals
office’s traditional negotiations approach led to reluctance in applying arbitration and mediation
programs as serious alternatives).
113. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 736–37. This outcome is especially probable because
favorably resolved mediations have already been recognized as demonstratively improving the
outlook of participants and reducing the odds of subsequent conflicts. See Klotsche, supra note 87.
This is true for both commercial and federal entities, which extensively utilize ADR. Id.
114. Parsly, supra note 12, at 707. Taxpayers’ reluctance to participate was seen as
“perplexing” because, in light of the daunting number of cases pending in the appeals system each
year, the actual number of cases submitted for mediation was comparatively insignificant. Id.
115. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
116. Parr, supra note 6.
117. MOSES, supra note 89, at 1.
118. Id. at 1–3.
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equal and valid alternatives to negotiation. Reforming its arbitration and
mediation programs has the potential to greatly improve the image and
reputation of the IRS Appeals Office, while also securing considerable
financial benefits to both the Service and to taxpayers. Based on the success
of mediation and arbitration in commercial contexts, as well as the success
of the Service’s limited experiments with mediation, it is reasonable to
believe that the two programs will flourish if given the chance. They should
be vigorously pursued by the Appeals Office going forward.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since its founding over eighty-four years ago, the IRS Appeals Office
has been one of the nation’s earliest dispute resolution entities, and it offers
a successful alternative to costly litigation through its well-established
negotiations procedures. Despite having proven that alternative dispute
resolution of tax disputes can be efficient and fair to both parties, the
Appeals Office has been understandably reluctant to expand its already
successful program to encompass arbitration and mediation as well, out of
concern that it may take away from the success they have had with
negotiations. However, while the present negotiations procedure is a viable
and enduring institution, there is ample incentive for the IRS to embrace
both mediation and arbitration as alternatives to the traditional negotiations
process.
Both the IRS and taxpayers would greatly benefit from increased
availability of refined mediation and arbitration programs, which save both
parties more time and money when utilized together than negotiations do
alone. By taking steps to convince taxpayers that their mediators and
arbitrators are independent, neutral third parties who will reliably help them
reach fair outcomes, the appeals process as a whole benefits by leading to
shorter appeals processes, more settlements, and reduced costs to all parties
while still achieving an equitable result.

299

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013

19

